Franz Kafka and the anxiety of judgment
I. Introduction: The Modern Heart-Throb
“I am a cage in search of a bird,” wrote Franz Kafka, one of the most iconic figures of modern world literature and Gen Z’s literary heartthrob. What do you, reader, think of someone who starts an essay with that phrase, who starts an essay about a writer with a quote of his? Maybe you’re intrigued. Maybe you found it cliché, or pretentious. And maybe now that I’ve mentioned that possibility, perhaps you’ve found that I’m trying too hard to be self aware. Maybe the self-awareness is itself a performance. You see, I’ve created an interpretative trap for where I can’t explain myself, because then my explanation has the potential to become part of the evidence in the case against me. In this thought experiment, I’m attempting to recreate the paralysis depicted in many of Kafka’s great works.
The terror of Kafka’s writings goes much deeper than the confusion and intimidation we feel when we find ourselves facing overwhelming bureaucratic systems. His oeuvre certainly does depict that, but what I think Kafka truly conveys best is a universal, overwhelming, and existential anxiety of the interpersonal. As inherently social creatures, humans contain a profound desire to be recognized by other people, and Kafka’s writings demonstrate the existential terror contained in conditions of that need for recognition. Embedded into all our interactions and endeavors is the possibility, the very real possibility, of judgement, pain, disregard, and humiliation. Yet that same possibility, which can be not only alienating but even paralyzing, is also a somehow thrilling and essential part of the modern human condition. The paradoxically tragic and comedic nature of our interior and exterior relationships makes life terrifying, absurd, and unbearably wonderful.
II. The Man Behind the Adjective: Who Was Kafka
Kafka is an incredibly intriguing and relatable figure. People liked him in his lifetime, afterwards, and he’s had a very powerful afterlife with people of my generation despite having lived more than a century ago. Born on July 3 1883, Franz was the first of six children to a Czech mother and German father who lived in Prague and kept a small shop. His two brothers died in infancy and three sisters outlived him. At university, he studied law, practiced for a year upon graduating, then started working for a local branch of an insurance company. His novels, The Trial, The Castle, and Amerika, albeit unfinished, are giants of German-language modernism. His shorter works like “The Metamorphosis,” “The Hunger Artist,” and “The Penal Colony,” are also works of what I see as genius. Although Kafka spoke both German and Czech (his mother was Czech and his father, German), his family, as many middle-class families during this period of the Austro-Hungarian empire, sent him to German-speaking schools for upward economic mobility, making German his primary language.
Kafka lived a short life, dying at 41 years old of tuberculosis. And before he died, he wrote this in a letter to his friend Max Brod: “Dear Max, My last request: Everything I leave behind me ... in the way of diaries, manuscripts, letters (my own and others’), sketches and so on, to be burned unread.” But Max Brod––luckily for us––went against his friend’s wishes. One thing I’ve always wondered about is whether Brod’s actions were ethical. The reading public are certainly the better for his disregard of Kafka’s wishes, but, if you believe in the dead’s possession of autonomy and right to privacy, it can certainly feel like some ethical boundary has been violated. For example, I write diaries––much less interesting, poetic, or literary than Kafka’s––and have for at least 12 years. I’ve kept all my diaries––largely because I am a collector and partially because I don’t know what else to do with them and feel weird about burning them––but I certainly wouldn’t want them publicized after my death. Were I to know of my imminent death, I would likely destroy them myself or, like Kafka, ask them to be burned. But then again, I’d be dead; so what does it matter to me? I guess it matters to my memory, those who are still alive.
In Brod’s postscript to the first edition of The Trial, which came out in 1925, he identified two grounds for justifying his failure to ‘commit the incendiary act:’ (1) Kafka’s standards were, in his words, ‘the highest religious standards,’ so nothing would have ever been good enough to publish were it up the author himself. Kafka had published some pieces, and his published writings received complimentary reviews from the likes of Robert Musil and Rainer Maria Rilke (ix). Why he chose not to publish his novels, I’m not sure. The other reason that Brod gives is where it gets sticky for me. He writes that apparently, he clearly told Kafka that he would not carry out his instructions and Kafka had not dismissed him as executor, therefore (he reasoned) in his heart Kafka must have known the manuscripts would not be destroyed. Is that fair grounds for disrespecting the writer’s wishes?
If you’ve ever read Kafka, then you know his unique power in conveying intense isolation and alienation and capturing the feeling of inadequacy. You may conjecture, then, that Franz was a sad, lonely man. To some extent he was, but it’s also clear from his friends’ testimony that he was “a charming and witty companion, a sportsman keen on hiking and rowing, and a thoroughly competent and valued colleague at work” (Castle BP viii). He was also very knowledgeable about a wide range of philosophy and theology in addition to, of course, literature. Kafka’s novels tend to surround some individual (usually bearing a K initial) confronting a powerful and opaque organization. I’ll give you some examples. In The Trial, an ordinary bank clerk named Josef K. wakes up one morning to two police officers in his room telling him he’s been arrested, but no one ever tells him what crime he committed. The Castle is about K. who, believing he’s been hired as a land surveyor by a lord of a castle, arrives at a remote village and spends the entire novel struggling to contact his employer and do his job. As famed literary translator Anthea Bell writes in her biological preface to the Oxford World’s Classic edition of The Castle, in the west, these fables appear to concern existential uncertainty whereas “in the Eastern bloc, when they became accessible, they seemed to be prescient explorations of the fate of the individual within a bureaucratic tyranny. Neither approach can be set aside.” I agree. However, she discusses the limitation of reading Kafka solely within his historical context (if you’re interested in a broader discussion about the idea of author and intention, I discuss it in my video and essay “The Art of Close Reading.”). Bell goes on to write that “Kafka worries at universal moral problems of guilt, responsibility, and freedom,” a list to which I would add, fear/anxiety/angst (ix-x). But, what exactly is fear, and how is it different from anxiety? And why is Kafka constantly circling fear thematically?
III. The Fearful and the Anxious: Heidegger and The Metamorphosis
In Being and Time, German philosopher Martin Heidegger makes a distinction between fear and anxiety that I think is useful for understanding Kafka. Heidegger’s philosophy is very complex and there’s no need to go into a deep dive on it right now. If you are curious about it, I’ll give you a little taste, and the simplest way I can formulate it is that: Heidegger’s philosophy is all about how we understand our existence only within the boundaries of our world and it examines how the things or phenomena (that’s why it’s called phenomenology) make themselves manifest to our perception within that world. That’s of course a very simplified version and yet on first glance, or listen, it can seem very convoluted. It honestly is. I spent an entire semester intensively studying just the first half of Being and Time and although I feel I understand a lot of it, that understanding came after a lot of headaches, discussions, and reiterations. If you didn’t get that Heidegger summary, don’t worry. You don’t need that to get the rest of the argument. But his formulation in particular of anxiety I find relevant in the context of Kafka’s writings.
Heidegger outlines how fear has a clear and particular object. Once that object is removed, the fear is also removed. So, let’s say I have a fear of the dark. The lights go off, I am afraid. I turn on my salt lamp, I am no longer afraid. Fear is about things that are present in the world in front of you. In what I read as a phenomenological account, Robert Campbell Roberts (yes that’s actually his name) in his 2003 essay Emotions, An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, writes that “emotions are a kind of perception” based on a particular concern (87). Thus, a father’s fear that a fire will hurt his daughter is a construal of the fire as dangerous based on the father’s desire that nothing bad happen to his daughter. By contrast, anxiety is indeterminate, it has no fixed object. The word for anxiety here is angst. Anxiety, for Heidegger, is when the self comes into relief as the world’s meaningless is revealed. He writes: “In anxiety, the everyday world slips away and my home becomes uncanny (unheimlich) and strange to me. From being a player in the game of life that I loved, I become an observer of a game that I no longer see the point in playing.” The world’s every day concerns feel an inauthentic spectacle in which I see no point participating. That detachment, for Heidegger, creates space for inquiry and change. It forms a kind of freedom. It was 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard that first invented the term “angst” (angest) in his 1844 text The Concept of Anxiety. But Heidegger really built out the concept very robustly with this explanation. The meaning of angst has transmuted to something different now in popular parlance, but its original meaning refers to this state of anxiety. By the same token, I feel anxiety has come to mean something different too––a phenomenon centered less around contemplation and more like fear combined with frenzy. That’s my personal interpretation of what people mean when they say they are anxious or are experiencing anxiety. I grant that there is a multiplicity of anxious experiences and that characterization will not fit them all. The closest I’ve personally felt to Heideggerian anxiety is when I’ve been afflicted with the feeling that I’m experiencing the world in third person, as if there’s a version me sitting in the back of my head watching the version of me enacting and living and speaking in the embodied world.
As I said, the anxiety that afflicts Kafka’s protagonists’ feels much closer to Heidegger’s conception of it, because in my reading of them, there’s a layer of acceptance underlying the fear and anxiety in Kafka’s characters, of inevitability. In The Metamorphosis, the tone of the first paragraph, describing when the protagonist Gregor “awoke one more from uneasy dreams” and “found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect” is methodical, observational, and not at all shocked. There’s not one exclamation point, not one moment of obvious terror or panic. Moreover, the grammar is very passive: “he found himself transformed,” almost as if he is an object of his own observation, which connects very clearly to Heideggerian angst. The description then moves from Gregor’s observation of his vermin body to his room, “a regular human bedroom,” to “a collection of cloth samples” related to his job as a commercial traveler. The necessary structures that created his human life and identity––his room and his job, namely––seem like this inauthentic spectacle, this tableau of what makes a life. The only exclamation mark that occurs in this first page is after Gregor examines the aforementioned objects and then his eyes land on a picture he had cut out from a magazine and hung. Here is the sentence: “It showed a lady, with a fur cap on and a fur stole, sitting upright and holding out to the spectator a huge fur muff into which the whole of her forearm had vanished!” I mean, the irony shines right through: Gregor’s entire human body has vanished and the most vehemence his mind can conjure is a plain interrogatory statement: “What has happened to me?” Whereas when one part of this woman’s forearm is gone, suddenly, there’s a sense of urgency and alertness. The juxtaposition of the depictions––a man trapped in a hard bug shell described dispassionately and a human woman with fur (the textures of their bodies are clearly antithetical) who garners an exclamation point––is deeply ironic and comedic in a melancholic and bone-dry way very distinct to Kafka. And Gregor’s psychological evaluation of their embodiments, and in particular, his attention to a lack, that which is missing when it comes to her is so uncanny! The state of Heideggerian anxiety that the protagonist finds himself in highlights, from the beginning, the inauthenticity of his previous conditions and foreshadows the tragic fate that awaits Gregor because his physical embodiment no longer allows him to play a part in the systems as it is expected of him. That brings us to fear.
For the fear that comes through in this novel relates to how Gregor will continue to be a productive member of his family after this existential metamorphosis. The primary object of fear in the narrative is his physical embodiment as an Other, a “gigantic insect.” However, the primary question pertaining to angst or anxiety is to what extent Gregor is still Gregor, to what extent he can still be called the same kind of being as he was before; what rules of the everyday can he still follow? His physical embodiment doesn’t allow him to partake in his labor, in being a financial resource for his family. After the apple Gregor’s father threw at him (mistakenly) “went on sticking in his body as a visible reminder, since one one ventured to remove it” and hurt Gregor (110), Gregor’s father “persisted in keeping his uniform on even in the house; his dressing gown hung uselessly on its peg and he slept fully dressed where he sat, as if he were ready for service at any moment and even here only at the beck and call of his superior” (111). Again, the juxtaposition of the imagery, on pages mirroring each other is just banging you over the head. Gregor can’t work anymore because of this condition that’s out of his control and moreover can’t even comfortably occupy the shared family space due to this injury inflicted on him by one of his two primary caretakers, specifically the male breadwinner. That same man, the father who is meant to serve as an aspirational persona, refuses to remove his work clothing, the outward symbols and signs that demonstrate his socioeconomic utility until his bodily impulses overcome him and cause him to move into a state antithetical to work: rest. Meanwhile, Gregor is an injured, guilty observer of familial duty. Fear lies in Gregor’s embodiment while anxiety arises from the ‘unnatural’ state that Gregor’s metamorphosis imposes on his household. Gregor, however, remains ‘a human being’ on his inside, or at least maintains a sense of a human mind. He deeply desires connection, especially with his sister, which comes through in a scene that I cried reading the first time I read it.
It happens after the passages I just quoted, and Gregor hears “the sound of violin-playing [coming] from the kitchen” (119). It’s his sister, Grete, who’s playing. Gregor, loving the music, wonders: “Was he an animal, that music had such an effect on him? He felt as if the way were opening before him to the unknown nourishment he craved” (121). He is unable to stop himself, and, Kafka writes, “in spite of his condition, no shame deterred him from advancing a little over the spotless floor of the living room” (120). Gregor knows he is breaking the rules of conduct, but he is too moved to care anymore. He tries many times to make eye contact with Grete as she’s playing, almost demanding recognition in the way he can. But she doesn’t look back. As we all do, Gregor contains a profound desire to be recognized by others, specifically his sister and family––those who theoretically love us the most truly. Once Gregor is recognized by the others in the room (including the other lodgers in the house who had some to see Grete play, he’s banished into his room again. Gregor’s need for recognition––perhaps both internally and externally––as a being, as a human, like the rest who can appreciate music and love condemns again and again to judgment, disapproval, and punishment. Disgust even. Following the theory of fear in The Monarchy of Fear by Martha Nussbaum, a distinguished philosopher and Professor at U. Chicago, fear is “an emotion that infests the other emotions––anger, disgust, and envy.” “All too often [fear] blocks rational deliberation, poisons hope, and impedes constructive cooperation for a better future.” This contention proves true for Gregor. At the end of this novella, Gregor dies of starvation and neglect. And his family are all the more relieved for it. It closes with the image of them on the tram headed for a vacation into the countryside and these lines “And it was like a confirmation of their new dreams and excellent intentions that at the end of their journey their daughter sprang to her feet first and stretched her young body” (132). The mirroring between the opening with Gregor’s uneasy dreams and his parents’ “new dreams” based on the patriarchally valuable aspects of their daughter––her youth and beauty––coming through clearly now that the burden of their deviant son is gone. The Metamorphosis typifies both the grotesque and the Kafkaesque, the latter of which is much thrown around but, to me, not as clearly defined as it could be. So let’s turn our attention to finding a good and clear definition through close reading The Trial.
IV. The Trial and The Doorkeeper: Kafkaesque Surveillance
Whenever an author’s name is put into adjectival form––some common examples are Orwellian, Dickensian, Freudian, and, of course, most relevant to this conversation, Kafkaesque––we get into slightly dangerous territory. Because what the writer represents remains, to some extent, up to the subjective interpretation of the person describing the object. In coming up with my own definition of the Kafkaesque, I wondered about its relation to the grotesque, mostly because the use of the suffix –esque rather than –ian like the other examples I could conjure up easily (I have seen some criticism use the form “Kafkan” but “Kafkaesque” is the term that I’ve seen the most). In his influential 1957 book, The Grotesque in Art and Literature, German scholar Wolfgang Kayser famously wrote that “the grotesque is the estranged world.” What he means here is not that it’s any world that we don’t recognize, like a world of a fantasy novel or film, for example, whose structure is alien to our own. Kayser explains that the grotesque is a structure that must necessarily include suddenness and surprise when “the categories which apply to our world view become inapplicable.” As Daniel Baumann, a Swiss historian, curator, and writer describes in his article: “Oh the Horror: A Brief History of the Grotesque,” the grotesque “effectuat[es] a metamorphosis, the grotesque creates an eccentric, hybrid space in which everything can be something else.” As a result, we who inhabit or observe this subversion or violation of our categories––such as beautiful and ugly, mundane and absurd, sympathetic and disgust––experience a feeling of strangeness/uncanniness towards the transformed typical elements of our quotidian life. Remind you of anyone?
Indeed, I couldn’t not read this as some ilk of Heideggerian angst, which ties us neatly to the existential condition that Kafka so astutely depicts. Some other relevant ideas to our understanding of the grotesque is how its exuberance, extravagance, and exaggeration of typically aesthetic aspects produce scenes and images that are horrifying and macabre, like Gregor’s body and his death. In The Trial, after his arrest, Josef K., albeit perplexed by the legal systems he’s moving through, continually seeks to understand what crime he has been charged with. Like with K. in The Castle, it feels like Josef K. is running in circles, or in a maze, getting nowhere closer to his intended destination. Before the second chapter, he’s on the precipice of giving up on this whole absurd endeavor when he’s brought to the judge. The court room is packed, and Josef K. passionately pleas for his innocence and disparages the injustice of this entire process. By doing that, of course, he strikes all the wrong notes by way of his arrogance and frankness––something not particularly valued in a bureaucratic system, iykyk. His speech is interrupted, and the scene ends with him yelling at the crowd that they’re all conspiring against him. The exaggeration of the absurdity of the crowd’s behavior and Josef K.’s response within this proceeding clearly leans towards the grotesque, but the image isn’t quite so overtly horrifying as the typical grotesque, nor is it related to the protagonist’s embodiment.
Because Kafka’s protagonists are constantly involved in systems of hierarchies and bureaucracies, many definitions of the Kafkaesque, like that of the New York Times in its 2024 article The Very Online Afterlife of Franz Kafka, focus on the administrative nightmarish scenarios we most likely have all found ourselves in between DMVs, immigration services (like when I was in the process a couple years ago to get my American citizenship), and in other dealings with the gubernatorial agencies that rule over us. However, I believe that bureaucracy is one manifestation of a broader Kafkaesque condition. Just as the grotesque is both an aesthetic and philosophical category, so is the Kafkaesque, and I see the Kafkaesque is a sort of subsection of the broader grotesque. The grotesque focuses more on physical forms and finding moments of unsettling hybridities that create this unsettling feeling. My working definition of the Kafkaesque is that it is a: ‘concurrent psychological and systemic blending or hybridization of the absurd and the mundane that leads to a tragicomedic satire of universal situations within modernity.’ As such, it relates to the structure of the grotesque while holding a Heideggerian level of ontological and metaphysical significance.
The Metamorphosis is the clearest prism through which to observe this because of the body horror involved with Gregor’s physicality; however, the mixture of disgust––which is constituted by the fear of one’s own embodiment and mortality according to Nussbaum––and empathy (a combination conjured by the grotesque) the reader feels that same conflicting melange of emotions towards the arrogant, defensive, and profoundly unlikable Josef K.. Unlike Gregor, who has a more meek demeanor, Josef K. is not a ‘perfect victim,’ so to speak; as a reader, I was not as sympathetic to Josef K. as I was towards Gregor because of his egotism, his lack of self-reflection, and how poorly he treats the female characters in particular. For example, while being certain he’s not guilty of an unknown crime, he says this of the people administering his case: “It’s only because of their stupidity that they’re able to be so sure of themselves.” The irony, of course, lies in the fact that Josef is also incredibly sure of himself, so if his own logic were to apply to his certainty of his innocence, it would also be because of his stupidity. That tension is deeply purposeful and important for the creation of the Kafkaesque in this text. By refusing to provide a noble hero or a narrator whose perspective is distinctly removed from the protagonist, in The Trial, we as readers are forced to witness a flawed, ordinary man’s downfall and inner ugliness revealed by its reflection in the seemingly mad social structure of his world. And because our voice is fused with his by way of the limited narrative perspective, we are also forced to identify with him to an extent, which puts us in a position of discomfort. Thus, when it comes to the question of our need for recognition, we observe from The Trial that that recognition isn’t always positive. Perhaps that is an idea that doesn’t need much close reading to establish. However, the inescapability of the possibility of this negative recognition and the accompanying paranoia and sense of disquieting suspense also forms an important part of the Kafkaesque concerns.
There’s an entire set of Penguin Schoken editions––I have those versions of The Metamorphosis, The Trial, and Kafka’s Diaries––that have eyes on the covers. According to Bell, Kafka “was sharply conscious of the problems of perception, and of the new forms of attention made possible by media such as the photograph and cinema” (The Castle BP ix). In both The Castle and The Trial, the protagonists are constantly being observed by figures of supposed authority or belonging to groups the protagonists themselves are outsiders to. The question of surveillance is very pertinent to our panoptic day and age where the potential and likelihood of being filmed/recorded/or otherwise observed by some kind of technology is incredibly high because of the ubiquity of cellphones, ring cameras, flock cameras, meta glasses, and the internet culture. Mina Le and OliSUNvia both have great videos on surveillance that I’ve linked below. Kafka presciently foresaw how, as Rice University Professor George Alliger puts it, “neither the watched nor their watcher escapes unscathed.” Unlike the oppressive visual dominance of Orwellian surveillance like with Big Brother, Kafka’s watchers are clandestine yet ubiquitous. Alliger writes that the subjects in Kafka’s stories have internalized the fact of their monitoring systems, which “cause[s] the surveilled subject to relinquish their agency and rights.” That’s… pretty clearly what’s already happened to us to a large extent. In a world where the potential of social or political judgment only arises in the presence of an other, someone else who can assess our actions, there is a sense of freedom in isolation, perhaps. But what happens when you start policing yourself? What do you stop yourself from doing, saying, being, and knowing if you’re ontologically and ethically limited by a socially constructed surveillance?
The Trial contains a famous parable that illustrates a nihilistic portrait of the extent to which our internalization of surveillance can dominate our lives. It’s in the chapter “In the Cathedral,” the penultimate chapter of the novel before the end where Josef K. gets stabbed in the heart and dies ““Like a dog!’” he claims. It begins with: “Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. A man from the country comes to this doorkeeper and requests admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he can’t grant him admittance now. The man thinks it over and then asks if he’ll be allowed to enter later. ‘It’s possible,’ says the doorkeeper, ‘but not now.’” Even though the man believes that “ the Law should be accessible to anyone at any time,” he decides that “he would prefer to wait until he receives permission [from the doorkeeper] to enter.” So he waits, and he waits, and years go by. He grows old, grumbling about his fate. Just before he dies, he asks the doorkeeper: ‘Everyone strives to reach the Law […] how does it happen, then, that in all these years no one but me has requested admittance,” to which the doorkeeper responds: “No one else could gain admittance here, because this entrance was meant solely for you. I’m going to go and shut it now” (215-217). This parable is incredibly rich, and it actually came out independently during Kafka’s lifetime in 1915 as a standalone piece titled “Before the Law” in the New Year’s edition of the independent Prague Jewish weekly newspaper, Selbstwehr and Kafka included it in his 1919 short story collection A Country Doctor. The parable’s progression mirrors the occurrences of the novel: through uncertainty and ambiguity, the doorkeeper telling the man from the country “not now” instead of “no” just as Josef K.’s proceedings keep tumbling onward seemingly indeterminately and indefinitely without a clear sense of reaching a verdict. Moreover, the parable is complex and the characters’ interpretations of it are confusing, meaning that in and of itself, the structure of the parable and the characters’ interpretations of it function like the law in the novel: every approach that should get the protagonist brings him closer, instead, brings him to another threshold. The man’s acceptance and internalization of the doorkeeper’s authority and the fear of the imagined hierarchy of the other doorkeepers paralyzes him from ever attempting to move beyond the first door. His interaction with the doorkeeper over the years mistakenly allows him to believe that that surveillance is some kind of positive engagement or relationship. And, because the boundary is never tested in the first place, neither we readers nor the man learn whether the power to cross actually belongs to him even though the doorkeeper says he could’ve gone through. One big difference between the man in the parable and the man in the novel is that Josef K. does resist the powers that be. But he becomes consumed by the idea of winning his Trial and his rebellion against the system, and both men end up literally giving their lives to the Law. That one character takes a path of acceptance and the other resistance yet both end up dead demonstrates Kafka’s at-times nihilistic approach when it comes to the possibility of vanquishing the broader systems in which the human condition necessarily occurs within modernity.
Of the parable, the chaplain who tells Josef K. the story claims that “you don’t have to consider everything true, you just have to consider it necessary” (223). That position is once again extremely relevant to not only how we consume and share information on social media nowadays but how that structures of surveillance and policing impact our abilities to be. Mina Le recently came out with a video called “what happened to ‘good taste’?” where she discusses the downfall of unique and creative expression due to the memeification of language. She employs the ‘kinda chic’ phrase that was originally subversive in its use to become overly saturated with attempts to monetize influence. Because I’m not on TikTok, Instagram, or any other social media platform besides YouTube, Mina’s channel is one of the only avenues through which I receive news about cultural phenomena like this. When the goal of some controlling force is to capitalize culturally, financially, and politically on sociocultural relevance demonstrated by one’s language use and sans-serif-butter-yellow-text aesthetics or whatever lingo-aesthetic combination is relevant to the moment, the veracity and authenticity of that endeavor can be called into question. And I’m not necessarily trying to surveil or police particular trends or even people monetizing their lives and ideas––although I feel hesitant to call myself a content creator (I rather prefer the term [video] essayist), I’m engaging in this paradigm myself to some extent. But in principle, my essays are ideas I believe in that I’m arguing for, positions I’m taking. In other words, things I think are true and valuable.
But if one’s end goal is to sell as much as possible––to ‘win’ in the capitalistic sense––things only need to feel necessary in order to persuade the consumer. What constitutes something that’s necessary in the world of social media, in my view, is feeling visible, relevant, and part of the in-group, which is demonstrated by participating in linguistic and/or aesthetic trends, reflecting the algorithm. The watched and the watcher are somehow coalescing into one, and the rise of people dressing in the same yet hyper-changing styles and adopting the same language or slang reflects an Orwellian sense of groupthink and a move away from originality in expression and creation. For me, it appears that the constant resultant cycling through sociocultural motifs results in a Kafkaesque existence. This desire to belong, to be recognized, is like we established right at the beginning, fundamental to our core as social beings, yet when it leads to an internalization of authority from fear of sociocultural alienation, perhaps we’ve gone too far, and we need to take a step back and laugh at it.
V. Laughing With Kafka: The Castle
I follow many great scholars in arguing that it would be a mistake to see Kafka’s work as all melancholy and tragedy. If you remember my working definition of the Kafkaesque, that it is a ‘concurrent psychological and systemic blending or hybridization of the absurd and the mundane that leads to a tragicomedic satire of universal situations within modernity.’ You’ll notice an emphasis on the comedic. In fact, Max Brod wrote that Kafka laughed so much while reading The Trial’s first chapter aloud to his friends “that at times he was unable to continue reading”. In David Foster Wallace’s speech “Laughing with Kafka,” he dissects the difficulty in explaining and enjoying Kafka’s humor with his students. To understand some of Kafka’s humor, he states that the author’s “funniness depends on some kind of radical literalization of truths we tend to treat as metaphorical,” but that after explaining it that way, “the teacher still sort of writhes with guilt, because the comedy-as-literalization-of-metaphor tactic doesn’t begin to countenance the deeper alchemy by which Kafka’s comedy is always also tragedy, and this tragedy always also an immense and reverent joy.” That unique mixture of tragicomedy is what I think defines the Kafkaesque. Relating this concept back to Heidegger, when we find ourselves in a state of angst, we are able to examine the conditions that typically present themselves to us as tragic and comedic as things with artificial barriers; there’s a liminality present in the diving line. Kafka has the unique ability to capture the comedy of the horrific and the terror of the comedic, and the thrill that it is to see that that blend is more prevalent in the conditions of modern life than we typically allow ourselves to see.
In The Castle, K.’s consistently strange interactions with the novel’s townsfolk encapsulates that paradox. From the premise, we already get how much of the comedy comes from a sense of mismatch or ill-fitting pieces: K. is called to do a job, comes, and then is evaded by people who hired him and struggles to get to the place he was called to to do the job he was hired for. That’s already both funny and unsettling. There’s also a pervasive deference between the townspeople towards the Castle––like when K. is identified as the castle’s land surveyor, those at the inn around him immediately change their attitude towards him. Yet people in mildly higher or seemingly random ranks of social position still deride him afterwards. As I was reading it, I tried to make a hierarchy list on my front cover to understand where K. as the land surveyor stood, but there are so many characters at random positions––like the different ranks of wardens and many secretaries––that it was not as helpful a resource as I imagined it could’ve been because there are so many random positions. Of course, that’s the point; the townsfolks’ sense of status is incredibly precise even when the underlying system is incomprehensible. There’s a terror and paralysis that can occur from feeling like you’re the only one in the dark, and a drive to get clarity. But the harder K pushes for a clean explanation, the more tangled everything gets. Unlike a joke where the pressure is released when the tension is resolved, when the mystery created by the set-up dissolves in the punch line, Kafka’s humor isn’t actually a break from the nightmarish scenario; it’s the nightmare seen from the right angle. Indeed, DFW warns that Kafka’s humor doesn’t operate by the same mechanics that a joke does, he says the central Kafka joke concerns the “horrific struggle to establish a human self results in a self whose humanity is inseparable from that horrific struggle. That our endless and impossible journey toward home is in fact our home.” In Kafka’s novels, the world is terrifying because it is irrational, but it is also funny because everyone behaves as though the irrationality is natural, obvious, and the way things ought to be.
Kafka himself wrote to his first fiancée, Felice Bauer (who shares initials with one of the female characters in The Trial): “I am even known as a big laugher”. Critic René Girard argues that laughter, like tears, can act as a true Aristotelian cathartic experience in tragedy; this kind of tragic-cathartic laughter is an emotional and physical manifestation of the crisis of the subject. Laughter also creates a deeper sense of crisis because, as a paroxysm, it threatens the autonomy and self-possession of the one who laughs uncontrollably (819). The irony and humor, then, is reflexive: it ought to bring the reader to an uncomfortable laughter, where we purge ourselves while realizing our paralyzed state: we are bound to the systems of signs, institutions, narratives, and technologies that mediate reality before we ever encounter it. It is inescapable and always already present in every act of communication, which ought to connect us to other people and the world. That is the condition of modernity Kafka conceptualizes and conveys, and what DFW expresses in the claim that Kafka’s writings reflect how “our endless and impossible journey toward home is in fact our home.” Laughter can also function as a mechanism of inflicting socioemotional pain by way of ridicule; this is not just limited to interpersonal interactions as we can laugh at and deride ourselves. The physical release of laughter allows it to envelop a tragicomic nature. And the Heideggerian state of angst is the state necessarily presupposed for us to allow for humor to slide in within the feeling of detachment from the typical quotidian structures that allows us to see them absurd.
Gen Z’s humor is also deeply absurdist. JREG and OliSUNvia also both have excellent videos on this topic. The Gen Z memes––which, to be honest, I often don’t understand––is a hyper-layered, hyper-ironic chaotic sense of the comedic that often also embraces nihilism. One interpretation of Kafka’s ‘dead-pan-ness,’ like the fact that although Gregor Samsa turns into a giant bug he is most afraid of missing his train to work, is that the author employs irony in a way that resonates with Gen Z. What Kafka’s worlds share with ours is its characters’ seemingly never ending subjection to the logic of productivity. Humor doesn’t necessarily have a ‘productive’ end besides enjoyment and physical release. Deeply absurd humor that creates in-groups by way of language, generation, and aesthetics serves both to create a sense of belonging and of release of the pressure to constantly be doing and improving as our modern lives seem to push us towards. There is no end point to optimization; there is no possibility K. will get to the castle or that Josef K. will win his trial––there is an acceptance of the fact of loss, death, and inescapability––yet we must continue at it; that is what life is. It’s absurd, and it’s thrilling that life requires us to engage with the absurd, and it’s absurd that we pretend it’s not but that pretending is what also brings us relief. Kafka reproduces in form and content how the inability to laugh at something because of its pointed relevance is precisely what makes it necessary to laugh. That may seem like it’s pushing us into postmodern territory, but I think it’s quite the opposite. While postmodernism deals with the absurdity by distancing itself and fragmenting and overanalyzing, Kafka’s tone and worlds have embedded within them a sense of acceptance, which is what makes it tragic. Categorizing this modern condition as tragic differentiates it pretty clearly from postmodernist humor where the reality of the human condition is itself a relative and linguistic and social construct or illusion. And I think Kafka’s sincerity is a big part of why he’s become gen z’s heartthrob.
VI. Conclusion: “I am a cage, in search of a bird”
Existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) wrote that humans are ‘condemned’ to be free, for existence precedes essence. As a result, we humans are burdened to create our essence and values for ourselves. The quote we began with, “I am a cage, in search of a bird” shows me that Sartre appears to follow Kafka in his idea that humans are empty vessels seeking things to contain within them that guide them towards a purpose as does the personified cage aphorism. In our postmodern era, the world is sometimes culturally presupposed to be relative and meaningless because everything is accepted as being constructed. Not only that, but the sense of powerlessness can feel overwhelming when thinking about our ability to influence greater structures. Disillusionment is constant and profound: the Epstein Files revealed the profound moral corruption of many important political and cultural figures, witnessing the current genocide in gaza constantly exposes us to horrific violence, seeing ads to join the army to fight in manipulated wars that are exponentially expediting the already existent affordability crisis, increasing evidence of looming mass surveillance and the seeming inescapability of artificial intelligence replacing humans in the already flailing economy. Much of the power to change these things seems to lie outside of our reach, and, as a result, a defensive mechanism we can take is to adopt an apathetic attitude towards these conditions. So, both the philosophical, social, and political realms of the modern world seem to push us towards a place where we can allow ourselves to forget about our steaks and vulnerability by falling into a dispassionate apathy.
Trying to do something or be something authentically puts the agent in a vulnerable position. The overwhelming truth of that vulnerability becomes even more painfully apparent in our panoptic age where we are all watching and being watched, and where the state of surveillance exists not as something overtly oppressive but as a lauded part of our entertainment and seen as essential within our ability to connect with others. Because of the internet, we are massively, deeply connected across places and spaces in ways impossible and perhaps even unimaginable during Kafka’s time. The world can be seen as overwhelming interpersonal in some ways. And in our profound desire for recognition and belonging, we mirror behaviors and language, we follow trends, we seek acceptance in social and parasocial situations. Yet a modern distinction is required to delineate the nature of a parasocial relationship, because it doesn’t actually require deep connection and an exchange of vulnerability. The possibilities of judgment, pain, disregard, and humiliation are typically uniquely one-sided. Those who leave derisive comments for and or commit acts of harassment against me can do so behind a mask of anonymity, facing no consequences as they are protected by the larger structure of the internet. Unlike a face-to-face interaction where someone will either think twice or maybe keep quiet about their discontentment because they fear the alienating or humiliating consequence, the internet erases that aspect of human interaction. And I think we are morally and socially the worse for it. The dynamics of the Internet allow for a parody of interpersonal relationship relationships by way of the parasocial. The terrifying yet thrilling potentiality of sudden and surprising joy or pain presented by social human interaction that Kafka conveys is becoming a smaller and smaller part of human interaction. I think that we have to push ourselves into more real human connections. We must seek our own many birds.
And, if we agree with Kafka and Sartre that we are cages, we cannot not fall into the trap of seeing life’s inherent meaninglessness and absurdity as a negative thing. Having to impose our own teleology on our lives is a worthwhile burden; it’s the whole point. It’s why I think the study of literature and philosophy (particularly ancient philosophy as I mentioned in my last video and essay), is more than worthwhile, but actually necessary. Furthermore, regardless of whether we think there is or is not an inherent meaning to life, we all care about something. That can be people, things, ideas, beliefs. And when we deeply care, it is terrifying, and it is wonderful. To his deepest love, Milena, Kafka wrote in a letter: “You are the knife I turn inside myself; that is love. That, my dear, is love.” In David Foster Wallace’s speech “This Is Water,” he poignantly said: “in the day-to-day trenches of adult life, there is actually no such thing as atheism. There is no such thing as not worshipping. Everybody worships. The only choice we get is what to worship. And the compelling reason for maybe choosing some sort of god or spiritual-type thing to worship…is that pretty much anything else you worship will eat you alive.” He goes on to saying of things like money, power, and intellect: “They’re the kind of worship you just gradually slip into, day after day, getting more and more selective about what you see and how you measure value without ever being fully aware that that’s what you’re doing.” Kafka’s novels and short stories present protagonists navigating through worlds that worship power, usually bureaucratic power but not always. The protagonists either buy into the system and struggle attempting to navigate and participate in it, like K. in The Castle; rebel against it but are forced to navigate it anyway, like Joseph K. in The Trial; or are alienated to the point of extinction because of their inability to participate in it, like Gregor in The Metamorphosis. When I first read The Metamorphosis many, many years ago, I remember the phrase that kept leaping into my mind was “indifference as brutality.” I think the same can be said for Josef K., especially in how his ‘final verdict’ is delivered to him. Indifference to the aspects of life, being a cage without a bird, leaves us feeling empty. And when we try to find the right bird or birds, we can and likely will fail. Failure is painful, humiliating. But it is what allows us to give a meaning to the conceptualization of success, which doesn’t have to mean a decisive victory over the systems that are out of our control. To reiterate DFW, to read Kafka and understand his tragicomedy, or in other words to see the Kafkaesque, is to see how “our endless and impossible journey toward home is in fact our home.” The state of modernity is largely inescapable, yet just because we can’t escape something doesn’t mean we’re trapped. Sometimes, restriction brings freedom, or release. Sometimes, only through (Heideggerian) anxiety can we experience the true nature of things––and what is life but an attempt to do that? So, let’s read on. More Kafka, more of it all.